Introduction
The right to 'choose a profession and practice it' is, according to Benjamin Constant (1988, p. 311) , one of the freedoms that constitute the liberty of the moderns. Indeed, a commitment to freedom of occupation is endorsed not only by classical liberals like Constant but also by contemporary liberal egalitarians, including John Rawls (2001, p. 158), Ronald Dworkin (2000, p. 90) , and G. A. Cohen (2008, pp. 218-220) .
However, when it comes to protecting the occupational freedom of the economically talented, liberal egalitarians face a dilemma: On the one hand, forcing the economically talented to abandon low-paying occupations for high-paying ones can, at least in theory, generate significant additional tax revenue -tax revenue that can improve the condition of the disadvantaged. On the other hand, doing so seems to violate occupational freedom, an important liberty.
Faced with this dilemma, liberal egalitarians have generally chosen to protect freedom of occupation, rejecting occupationally coercive taxes, despite their egalitarian benefits. They have given a wide variety of justifications for this position -more than can possibly be explored in a single article. My goal here is to examine the viability of three of the most prominent liberal egalitarian justifications for rejecting occupationally coercive taxation:
1. The argument that a commitment to economic equality, understood in terms of envy-freeness, rules out occupationally coercive taxation (Dworkin 2000, pp. 90-91) 2. The argument that occupationally coercive taxation violates the priority of the Rawlsian basic liberties (Rawls 2001p., 158) .
3. The argument that implementing occupationally coercive taxation would require information-gathering by the state that is impractical, counterproductive, or entails unacceptable violations of privacy (Cohen 2008, pp. 218-219) I shall argue that none of these prominent strategies succeeds.
In criticizing these three strategies, I do not wish to suggest that liberal egalitarians should abandon their commitment to the occupational freedom of the economically talented or that liberal egalitarianism is fundamentally incapable of safeguarding this important liberty. Instead, my aim is to motivate liberal egalitarians to devote greater scholarly attention to alternative justifications for rejecting occupationally coercive taxation. Such alternatives include Kristi Olson's (2010) appeal to an egalitarian notion of occupational options to which citizens have strong moral claims, Warren Quinn's (1989) and Michael Otsuka's (2008) appeal to the integrity of the individual, and Paula Casal's (2009) appeal to the importance of the fair value of occupational liberty.
At the end of this article, I shall make a preliminary case for one of these neglected alternatives: an idea put forward (but not developed) by G.A. Cohen (2008, p. 220) that certain types of occupational coercion impermissibly use the economically talented as a means. Liberal egalitarians are more likely to seriously engage with this idea and with other approaches to safeguarding the occupational freedom of the economically talented once the problems with the three traditional strategies considered in this article have been revealed.
Liberal egalitarianism and occupationally coercive taxation
Liberal egalitarian theory is defined in part by a commitment to egalitarianism of some type in the economic sphere. This commitment is grounded in the idea that the distribution of certain factors (e.g., natural talents) is in some sense morally arbitrary.
Liberal egalitarians generally call for tax schemes whose aim is to spread the economic benefits that flow from these morally arbitrary factors more equally (Kymlicka 2001, Ch. 3).
However, certain taxes that appear well-suited to achieving this egalitarian goal are morally problematic. Consider, for example, the following tax:
1 Endowment Tax: Adrian has an extraordinary knack for agriculture that gives him the ability to be a farmer with a yearly salary of $500,000.
However, Adrian would much prefer to be a poet, an occupation in which he could earn a more modest salary of $50,000. If the government were to subject Adrian to a 30% income tax (a tax on the income he actually earns), Adrian would choose to be a poet. The government would obtain $15,000 of tax revenue.
However, the government instead subjects Adrian to a 30% endowment tax (a tax based on the income he could earn at his highest paying occupation). With this $150,000-a-year tax in place, Adrian can no longer afford to be a poet, and so he becomes a farmer.
Note that endowment taxation has impressive egalitarian benefits relative to income taxation. The government obtains just $15,000 from Adrian under income taxation compared with $150,000 under endowment taxation. Assuming that these additional funds are redistributed to the disadvantaged, endowment taxation seems to have significant potential for fostering economic equality (at least relative to standard income taxation with similar rates).
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Yet I take it that endowment taxation is impermissibly occupationally coercive, despite these egalitarian benefits -a position shared by many liberal egalitarians. 3 A key challenge for these liberal egalitarians is justifying the rejection of endowment taxation without also rejecting income taxation. This challenge has come to be known as the endowment tax puzzle (Olson 2010, pp. 240-241) .
While the endowment tax puzzle is difficult to solve, it may in fact constitute only part of the challenge facing liberal egalitarians committed to safeguarding occupational freedom. After all, there may well be other taxes that are unacceptably occupationally coercive besides standard endowment taxation, and liberal egalitarians interested in safeguarding freedom of occupation will need to be able to coherently reject them all.
The question, then, is how large is the set of unacceptably occupationally coercive taxes. Christofidis (2004) rightly points out that the simple demonstration that a tax leads the economically talented to envy the economically untalented is insufficient reason to dismiss it on grounds of Dworkinian equality. After all, a fully envy-free solution is impossible in any society with a plausible diversity of non-transferable talents and occupational preferences (Varian 1975) . Indeed, as Dworkin (2000, pp. 104-105) recognizes, the progressive income taxation that he ultimately endorses leaves some less economically talented individuals envying highly economically talented individuals.
Christofides (2004, pp. 285-287) rightly concludes that, in order to dismiss violations of the occupational freedom of the talented on egalitarian grounds, Dworkin needs to explain why we should worry so much more about the talented envying the untalented rather than the other way around.
Christofides's argument is sound. But it does not present an insurmountable challenge to the Dworkinian view. Dworkin does not, after all, develop an account of how to choose between two distributions neither of which is envy-free. If a Dworkinian were able to justify granting moral priority to the envy of the talented, 6 then a concern with Dworkinian economic inequality could plausibly serve as the foundation for the freedom of occupation of the talented, Christofides's critique notwithstanding.
However, I shall argue in the rest of this section that, even if we grant priority to the envy of the economically talented, we will still be unable to protect their occupational freedom. There are two different cases that can support this conclusion. Consider first the case of endowment taxation in a society with a radically restricted range of talents.
Imagine, for example, that the rest of Adrian's society is made up entirely of middleincome fishermen who have no talent for either poetry or farming. Even with an endowment tax in place, it is not necessarily true that Adrian will envy any of the fishermen. He might prefer being a farmer while paying an endowment tax to being a fisherman earning a middling income. This society could fully satisfy the envy test, then, even with the endowment tax in place. Yet I take it that endowment taxation would nevertheless be unacceptably occupationally coercive, even in a society with such a restricted set of talents.
More generally, in order to unambiguously rule out Endowment Tax by appeal to Adrian's envy, someone in Adrian's society must lack the talent that Adrian does not want to use (farming) while having the talent that Adrian wants to use (poetry). If there is no one in society with this combination of talents, then endowment taxation need not run afoul of the envy test at all. If endowment taxation is nevertheless constitutes a violation of occupational freedom, this demonstrates that an appeal to the envy of the talented is insufficient to protect the economically talented from unacceptable occupational coercion.
There is a second way of challenging the appeal to the envy of the talented -one that has purchase even in a society with a wide variety of talents. Instead of endowment taxation, consider a tax that I call the talent-use tax. The talent-use tax works in the following way: Whenever a person uses a particular talent as part of her work, she has to pay a per-time-unit tax proportional to the income that would be generated by the highest market value use of that talent for that time unit. She does not, however, have to pay a tax based on a talent that she chooses not to use. We might imagine the government having a series of meters with different rates that start running whenever someone uses a talent as part of her work.
To better understand the tax, consider following example:
Talent-Use Tax: Bianca has a rare talent for abstract mathematical reasoning. She would most prefer to use her talent for constructing mathematical puzzles for popular entertainment. This occupation would provide Bianca with a pre-tax income of $50,000. Bianca can also use her rare mathematical gifts as a financial engineer, an occupation with a pretax income of $500,000. Finally, Bianca could work as a bookkeeper, a profession which also pays $50,000 but which makes no use of Bianca's special talent for abstract mathematical reasoning.
If the government were to place a 30% talent-use tax on Bianca, she would no longer be able to afford to be a puzzle creator because that occupation requires the use of the same talents that could be more productively employed in finance.
Thus, Bianca has two options: Be a financial engineer with a high income, or a bookkeeper with a decent income. Bianca decides to become a financial engineer.
Carol is similar to Bianca except that Carol lacks Bianca's abstract mathematical reasoning and thus cannot become either a puzzle creator or a financial engineer.
The talent-use tax demonstrates the inadequacy of the appeal to envy-freeness to protect the occupational freedom of the economically talented. I take it that the talent-use tax is unacceptably occupationally coercive. Yet it does not run afoul of the envy test.
After all, by foregoing the use of her unique talent for highly abstract mathematical reasoning altogether, Bianca could avoid the talent-use tax and have the exact same range of opportunities open to her as Carol does. If Bianca chooses to use her talent despite the talent-use tax to become a financial engineer, it must be that she at least weakly prefers having her native endowment, even with the tax in place, to Carol's native endowment.
Note the difference between Adrian's and Bianca's situations. Adrian wishes to use a less economically productive talent (poetry) rather than a more economically productive talent (farming) -a talent that Adrian wishes he did not have. Bianca, on the other hand, does not have a talent that she views as a curse. Rather she has a talent (a rare ability for abstract mathematical reasoning) that she wants to use in a way that she finds most valuable rather than in a way that society would find most valuable. Although a commitment to envy-freeness can rule out an endowment tax that forces Adrian to abandon poetry (at least assuming a certain distribution of talents in society), it cannot rule out a talent-use tax that forces Bianca to abandon puzzle-creation.
To summarize, Dworkin argues that a commitment to economic equality, understood in terms of envy-freeness, protects the talented from unacceptable occupational coercion. However, as both the example of a society with endowment taxation and a limited diversity of talents and the example of the talent-use tax in a society with a wide range of talents demonstrate, even if priority were given to the envy of the economically talented, unacceptably occupationally coercive taxation cannot be rejected solely by appealing to the Dworkinian conception of economic equality.
The Rawlsian appeal to the priority of liberty
Unlike Dworkin, Rawls does not argue that unacceptably occupationally coercive taxation should be rejected on egalitarian grounds. Instead, in his discussion of endowment taxation in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001, pp. 157-158) , 7 Rawls rejects these taxes on the grounds they violate the priority of liberty. Rawls writes:
For our purposes … the relevant difficulty is that [endowment taxation] would violate the priority of liberty. It would force the more able into those occupations in which earnings were high enough for them to pay off the tax in the required period of time; it would interfere with their liberty to conduct their life within the scope of the principles of justice. They might have great difficulty practicing their religion; and they might not be able to afford to enter low-paying, though worthy, vocations and occupations. (Rawls 2001, p. 158) Rawls seems to appeal here to endowment taxation's propensity to violate basic liberties, which are granted lexical (or roughly lexical) priority over the demands of economic equality in Rawls's theory of justice (Rawls 1999, pp. 53-55 Therefore, the Rawlsian appeal to the priority of basic liberties to rule out unacceptably occupationally coercive taxation cannot succeed (at least not without a very substantial reworking of the idea of the basic liberties and their place in Rawlsian liberal egalitarianism).
The need to appeal to freedom of occupation as a basic liberty
Rawls is no doubt right that some unacceptably occupationally coercive taxes violate a wide variety of basic liberties. For example, endowment taxes that are set so high that they force the economically talented to work for every possible waking hour for the sake of the disadvantaged would indeed make it very difficult for individuals to practice their religion, thus violating freedom of conscience. This extreme endowment tax regime would violate a variety of other basic liberties as well.
However, the claim that all unacceptably occupationally coercive taxes necessarily violate a variety of Rawlsian basic liberties is false. To see why, consider the following example:
Endowment Tax with Permissible-Income-Tax Rates: Assume that Adrian's society currently has an income tax regime with rates set so that none of the basic liberties are violated (e.g., those in high-paying occupations do not pay so much in income taxation that they have difficulty practicing their religion). Under this regime, Adrian chooses to be a poet.
The government implements an endowment tax regime with rates equivalent to the rates of the income tax regime. 9 Faced with this regime, Adrian becomes a farmer.
This endowment tax regime is, I take it, unacceptably occupationally coercive.
Yet it can be rejected by appeal to the priority of the basic liberties only if freedom of occupation is accepted as a basic liberty. To see why, note that, before the endowment tax regime was introduced, those in high-paying occupations were ex hypothesi able to enjoy all of the basic liberties while paying income taxes. And since the rates of the endowment taxation are no higher than the rates of the basic-liberties-respecting income tax regime, as long as the economically talented (e.g., Adrian) surrender their preferred occupations in favor of their highest-paying occupation available to them, they would be able to enjoy just as many basic liberties as were enjoyed by those who were in highly- Note also that a narrow conception of freedom of occupation as a basic liberty will not do here. After all, the Endowment Tax with Permissible-Income-Tax Rates does not frogmarch individuals into some arbitrary occupation determined by some central authority. And if we assume a beachcombing option for all individuals and add a beachcombing exemption to this version of the endowment tax (as was done in Section 1), we also will not be able to appeal to a principle of occupational freedom that only rules out individuals being forced into a single occupation. In order to protect Adrian from these variations on standard endowment taxes that are, I take it, unacceptably occupationally coercive, Rawlsians will have to endorse a conception of freedom of occupation as a basic liberty that is fairly broad.
Is the freedom of occupation a Rawlsian basic liberty?
The key question, then, is this: Can freedom of occupation (in the broad sense needed to rule out the different variations of endowment taxation suggested above) be coherently included as a Rawlsian basic liberty?
In considering this question, it is worth noting that Rawls himself does not endorse a consistent view of freedom of occupation as a basic liberty (Cohen 2008, pp. 196-197) . In the canonical statements of the basic liberties in Theory of Justice, freedom of occupation is not included (Rawls 1999, p. 53 i) The capacity for a sense of justice
ii) The capacity for a conception of the good -the capacity to have, to revise, and rationally to pursue an ordered family of final ends and aims which specifies what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life (Rawls 2001, pp. 18-19) .
It is fairly clear how, say, protection from slavery is necessary for the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers. However, it is not at all clear how a tax that forces some of the economically talented to abandon their preferred low-paying occupation interferes with the adequate development and exercise of the two moral powers. Highly paid farmer McDonald (who, let us assume, has no talent for poetry) is, I
take it, able to develop and exercise his two moral powers. Why, then, would Adrian the highly paid farmer be unable to develop and/or exercise his two moral powers simply because he was forced to abandon poetry for farming?
Unfortunately, Rawls says little about why freedom of occupation is necessary for the development and exercise of the two moral powers. What we are told in Political Liberalism is that freedom of occupation is part of the 'the liberty and integrity of the person' which, along with prohibitions against slavery, serfdom, and freedom of movement, is necessary to safeguard the exercise of the other basic liberties (Rawls 2005, p. 335) . Since the other basic liberties are necessary for the exercise the two moral powers, and since freedom of occupation is necessary for safeguarding these other basic liberties, freedom of occupation is necessary for the adequate development and full exercise of the two moral powers.
But how would a tax that did nothing more than force the economically talented to abandon certain low-paying occupations for high-paying ones threaten any of the other basic liberties? Although Rawls does not answer this question, perhaps the answer is that certain occupations are inextricably tied up with certain basic liberties. For example, I
may hold a very strict religious creed that requires me to become a monk. Or I may need to become a (low-paid) community organizer in order to exercise my political liberties.
When particular occupations are tied up with these basic liberties, the violation of freedom of occupation perpetrated by endowment taxation would admittedly also threaten these other basic liberties.
However, this threat can be neutralized by allowing exemptions in endowment taxation for individuals in occupations connected to the basic liberties (e.g., certain religious or political vocations). Societies do, after all, provide exemptions of this sort in the case of other forms of taxation (e.g., making certain goods like ritual wine exempt from sales tax). There is admittedly a problem of where to draw the line. But just as it would be implausible to reject all sales taxes on the grounds that a) goods connected to freedom of conscience should be exempt from sales tax; and b) it is difficult to draw the line between goods needed to exercise freedom of conscience and other goods, so too it seems difficult to argue that all unacceptably occupationally coercive taxation must be rejected merely because a small minority of occupations may be necessary for the exercise of freedom of conscience or political liberty. Once we admit the possibility of targeted exemptions, it seems very difficult to rule out non-extreme forms of endowment taxation by appealing to the connections between certain occupations and the other basic There are, however, several problems with Titelbaum's argument. The first is that the analogy he draws between freedom of occupation and freedom of conscience relies on an important misreading of Rawls. Titelbaum (2008, p. 310) The answer cannot simply be that personal commitments like pursuit of one's vocation are more important than enjoying greater material well-being (even when one is badly off). After all, there is no warrant for assuming that the worst off will utilize the proceeds of occupationally coercive taxes merely to improve their material well-being.
They might use the additional resources instead to fulfill the personal commitments that are central to their life plans (e.g., to move to be closer to an aging parent or to be able to pursue their occupational calling the goals of the economically talented, central though they might be to reasonable life plans, to always take precedence over considerations of social welfare and economic equality (as we would be required to do if we protected these goals under the aegis of the first principle of justice) seems to necessitate accepting distributive consequences that few liberal egalitarians are likely to (or should) endorse.
To be clear, these criticisms do not imply that freedom of occupation should never be given priority over egalitarian considerations. Moreover, I agree with Titelbaum that the centrality of occupational choice to reasonable life plans is a key reason why freedom of occupation is worthy of special protection, despite the greater economic benefits that its violation can produce. My claim is only that freedom of occupation of the kind needed to rule out most forms of endowment taxation cannot be plausibly and coherently protected by being granted the status of a Rawlsian basic liberty, at least not given Rawls's theory as it currently stands.
The appeal to problems of information
The third and final strategy for protecting freedom of occupation that I wish to consider appeals to problems relating to information. Some have argued that unacceptably occupational coercive taxes should be rejected because they are unfeasible, counterproductive, or morally unacceptable due to information-related problems. To implement standard endowment tax, for example, the government must determine how much income a person could potentially earn in her highest-paying occupation. Many liberal egalitarians have pointed out that the government simply lacks access to the relevant information (e.g., Rawls 2001, pp. 157-158) . And attempts to gather the information could counterproductively lead citizens to hide their talents, leading to inefficiency and loss of redistributive tax revenue (Rawls 2001, p. 158) , (Dworkin 2000, p. 100), (Cohen 2008, p. 219 ). Even more problematically, such information-gathering would, G. A. Cohen (2008, pp. 221-222) claims, require unacceptable violations of privacy. Thus, on this view, occupationally coercive taxes are unacceptable due to the practical and moral problems with gathering the necessary information.
One obvious problem with this information-based argument is that perfect information does not seem to make occupationally coercive taxation morally acceptable.
To take a fantastical but clear example, imagine that a genie causes every person's maximum earning potential to be clearly displayed above their heads. In this case, there would be no information-based objections to endowment taxation. Yet I take it that endowment taxation would still be unacceptably occupationally coercive. If so, then problems relating to information cannot constitute the fundamental objection to occupationally coercive taxation.
There is also a second objection to relying on information-based problems to reject unacceptably occupationally coercive taxes -one that does not rely on unrealistic perfect-information assumptions. Namely, information problems do not preclude all forms of unacceptably occupationally coercive taxation. Indeed, I shall argue in the rest of this section that there is a tax that is unacceptably occupationally coercive, economicequality-enhancing, and feasible without gathering information about particular individuals: the economically-suboptimal-occupation tax.
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The economically-suboptimal-occupation tax works in the following way.
Assume that there already exists a progressive income tax (with tax levels set using the reader's preferred liberal egalitarian theory). In addition to this income tax, the government adds a set of taxes (economically-suboptimal-occupation taxes) on anyone engaged in certain occupations. The targeted occupations are those that require special talents, but that pay significantly less than other occupations that require the same special talents. A tax is levied on a particular occupation only if economists are fairly certain that such a tax would increase total tax revenue. Moreover, occupations that are deemed to be particularly socially valuable or equality-promoting (e.g., teachers, social workers, etc.) are exempted. The aim of the tax is to increase redistributive tax revenue by inducing individuals to enter more economically productive vocations.
To see how this task would work more concretely, consider one possible economically-suboptimal-occupation tax:
Economically-Suboptimal-Occupation Tax on Sports Statisticians: Dan has a good head for statistics and a love of sports. In a world with only an income tax in place, Dan would have become a sports statistician (despite the relatively low salary associated with this profession compared with other statisticians).
However, the government places a heavy economically-suboptimaloccupation tax on sports statisticians. Faced with this tax, Dan becomes an actuary.
I take it that this tax is unacceptably occupationally coercive. Yet this tax is perfectly feasible. Moreover, as I shall argue, it is difficult to object to this tax either on grounds that information problems would make it counterproductive from an egalitarian perspective or on ground that it violates individual privacy.
Note first that this tax is very likely to increase rather than decrease equality overall, primarily because it will increase redistributive tax revenue. Unlike endowment taxation, this tax cannot be avoided by hiding one's talents. The only way to avoid it is by abandoning sports statistics. And since sports statisticians have economically valuable mathematical skills, many individuals who abandon sports statistics will enter higher paying occupations (e.g., they will become statisticians in a less exciting field such as insurance). With a progressive income tax in place, this means that the government's redistributive tax revenue will increase significantly. The government would also obtain higher tax revenue from the individuals who remain sports statisticians despite having to pay the economically-suboptimal-occupation tax.
Admittedly, some individuals who would have otherwise been sports statisticians will enter lower-paying occupations, thus reducing overall redistributive tax revenue.
However, given that sports statisticians are not paid particularly well yet have mathematical skills that are economically valuable, it is easy to imagine a society in which the tax revenue gained would outweigh the tax revenue lost. 15 Some might object that this tax could decrease equality because of its effects on the welfare of those who must leave their preferred occupation. However, this is unlikely. After all, most individuals subject to economically-suboptimal-occupation taxes will have the option of entering less desirable but still high-paying occupations.
They also have the option to pursue occupations that do not require their uncommon, economically valuable talents. It seems unlikely that an economically-suboptimaloccupation tax would make individuals subject to it worse off than the average person.
And even if some individuals were brought below some society average, given the additional redistributive tax revenue that this tax is likely to generate, the egalitarian effects of this tax seem very likely to be positive in aggregate.
It is also difficult to object to this tax on grounds of invasions of privacy. Unlike endowment taxation, economically-suboptimal-occupation taxes do not require information about any particular person's talents or preferences. There are several relatively low-paying, generally enjoyable occupations that clearly require the same (or sufficiently similar) talents as are required by much higher paying, less satisfying occupations. Sports statisticians have the mathematical skills to be other types of statisticians. Political philosophers generally have the skills to be good lawyers. Given the availability of economic data, computing power, and the relative sophistication of labor economics, it seems plausible that governments in contemporary liberal democracies would be able to implement a set of economically-suboptimal-occupation taxes that, on the whole, would raise more revenue for redistribution than progressive income taxation alone, producing a net increase in economic equality without the need to gather information about the talents of particular individuals.
In summary, information problems provide insufficient grounds for rejecting unacceptably occupationally coercive taxation. Assuming perfect information does not make endowment taxation morally acceptable. Moreover, even in the real world, information problems cannot protect the economically talented from unacceptable occupational coercion. Economically-suboptimal-occupation taxes are practicable and equality-enhancing without requiring private information about particular individuals' preferences or talents. Yet I submit that they are also unacceptably occupationally coercive.
What makes a tax unacceptably occupationally coercive?
I have argued thus far that appeals to Dworkinian equality, the priority of Rawlsian basic liberties, and problems relating to information-gathering cannot protect the economically talented from unacceptably occupationally coercive taxes. This class of taxes include not only standard endowment taxes, but also endowment taxation with beachcombing exemptions, the talent-use tax, and the economically-suboptimaloccupation tax introduced in this piece. In this final section, I wish to return to the question of why these taxes are unacceptably occupationally coercive. Building on an idea briefly mentioned (but not developed) by G. A. Cohen, I will suggest that these taxes (but not income taxes) are unacceptably occupationally coercive because they use the economically talented as a means in a certain morally impermissible way.
In giving his reasons for rejecting occupational coercion of the economically talented, G. A. Cohen (2008, p. 220 Cohen (2008, pp. 218-220) affirms Despite its modesty, this task is useful for three reasons:
1. It may go some way to convincing those who are unsure that that the taxes introduced above are indeed unacceptably occupationally coercive.
2. It may give pause to scholars such as Kirk Stark who believe that there simply is no plausible, principled way of distinguishing income taxation from unacceptably occupationally coercive taxation (Stark 2005) .
3. It can serve as an illustration (albeit preliminary) of the kind of development of an alternative strategy for safeguarding occupational freedom that this article aims to motivate.
One sense in which all of the taxes introduced in this piece (but not income taxes)
use the talented as a means is this. They intentionally induce the talented to abandon their preferred occupations in order to extract additional tax revenue from them.
Occupational abandonment is not some incidental by-product of endowment taxation and of the other taxes introduced in this piece. Rather, leading talented individuals to abandon their preferred occupation -a key life goal for many of them -is very much the intention of the tax designer. The designer's aim is to induce the talented to put their minds and bodies to work in ways that are more socially productive rather than in the ways that the economically talented would choose for themselves. And it is through inducing the talented to abandon their preferred occupation that much of the additional revenue for the disadvantaged is raised.
Consider, for example, the economically-suboptimal-occupation tax (in many ways, the least coercive of all the taxes considered here). This tax admittedly leaves Dan with the option of entering a variety of occupations outside of statistics. This tax also may not necessarily be so onerous so as to take Dan below some minimal acceptable standard of living if he chooses to remain a sports statistician. Nevertheless, this tax imposes significant costs on those who resist utilizing their talents in the socially optimal way. And it does so in order to induce a large number of these individuals to abandon their preferred occupation for higher-paying vocations -vocations in which they will pay higher taxes.
In doing so, this tax and the other taxes introduced in this piece deny, in at least one important sense, that the economically talented are entitled to have authority (without being subject to coercively-imposed penalties) over how their talents should be used. In denying the talented this authority, these taxes effectively treat these talents, at least to some extent, as social assets -something that can be permissibly put to work for the least advantaged -rather than something that belongs to particular talented individuals in question. 17 In this way, these taxes treat the economically talented as a means for the sake of the disadvantaged. unintended by-product of helping the disadvantaged. The income tax is not designed to deprive Hillary of the ability to make climbing mountains her eventual vocation, and it is not through inducing Hillary to abandon her preferred occupation that the redistributive tax revenue for the disadvantaged is raised. Thus, the claim that the economically talented should not be used as means for the sake of the disadvantaged, developed in a particular way, ties together the taxes introduced in this piece and does so in a way that does not classify income taxation as unacceptably occupationally coercive.
Clearly, much more remains to be said in defense of this tentative hypothesis. I
have not explained why using the talented as a means in this way is problematic, why occupational choice should be given more protection than the proceeds of one's labor, nor why the talented have the kind of partial self-ownership that grants them authority to use their talents as they choose (given what others are willing to pay for those talents)
rather than being forced to use them in the most socially desirable way. 18 I have also not considered the myriad other possible ways of explaining why certain taxes are unacceptably occupationally coercive while income taxation is not.
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However, my aims in laying out this hypothesis were self-consciously modest.
And the brief development of the idea that certain forms of occupational coercion impermissibly use the talented as means provided here is, I hope, sufficient to achieve these modest aims -not least of which is motivating future research into the important question of why certain forms of occupational coercion are impermissible.
Conclusion
This article's central claim is that the following three prominent liberal egalitarian strategies for protecting the freedom of occupation of the economically talented all fail:
1) The Dworkinian argument that economic equality (as captured by the envyfree standard) rules out unacceptable occupationally coercive taxation.
2) Rawlsians' appeal to the priority of basic liberties to rule out unacceptably occupationally coercive taxation.
3) The argument that unacceptably occupationally coercive taxation should be rejected due to the practical and moral problems with gathering the necessary information.
The rejection of these strategies does not imply that liberal egalitarianism cannot protect freedom of occupation. The argument does suggest, however, that compellingly and coherently protecting freedom of occupation while remaining committed to economic equality is more difficult than many of the leading liberal egalitarian thinkers have recognized.
Some liberal egalitarians might respond to these difficulties by stepping back from their commitment to the occupational freedom of the economically talented. 1. This example is based on on a case presented by Dworkin (2000, p. 90) .
2. This example admittedly overestimates the revenue benefits of endowment taxation by ignoring the general equilibrium consequences of forcing large number of individuals into high-paying occupations. However, setting aside practical difficulties, there is little doubt that replacing income taxation with, say, endowment taxation with equivalent rates will almost surely raise more revenue for redistribution. For discussion, see (Zelenak 2006 (Zelenak , pp. 1149 (Zelenak -1153 3. For a review of liberal egalitarians' objections to endowment taxation, see (Zelenak 2006 (Zelenak , pp. 1153 (Zelenak -1172 4. Dworkin offers different formulations of equality in different places. This is the standard of equality that Otsuka (2002) attributes to Dworkin. 5. The proposal that Dworkin (2000, p. 90) considers is a special type of endowment taxation that would result if we allowed individuals to bid for others' labor in Dworkin's hypothetical auction. 6. There are many ways one could defend this type of claim. One could, for example, argue that causing inequality (relative to some no-tax baseline) through the tax system is worse than allowing inequality to occur. 7. Although Rawls uses the term 'head taxes,' it is clear he is considering what is generally known as endowment taxation in the literature -taxes based on what individuals could earn rather than what they do earn. 8. I recognize that Rawlsians may have other ways of ruling out endowment taxation besides appeal to violations the basic liberties. An inquiry into these alternative avenues for ruling out unacceptably occupationally coercive taxation is precisely the kind of scholarly work that this article hopes to motivate. means) that our freedom to pursue our preferred occupation must be respected, even at the cost of significant egalitarian benefits. 18. Self-ownership of the kind the hypothesis relies upon been criticized by many scholars, including Cohen (1995) , and I certainly do not claim that Cohen would endorse the particular way in which I develop his brief appeal against using persons as a means. 19. For some examples, see the introduction to this article.
